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Calculating Exemptions in Bankruptcy 
All Points Capital Corp. v Meyer  
(In re Meyer) (BAP 9th Cir 2007) 373 BR 84 
 
In determining extent of exemptions, liens against entire fee must be subtracted 
before computing value of debtor’s interest in co-owned property. 
 
Meyer co-owned a residence valued at $515,000 that was encumbered by a consensual 
debt of $232,005. He scheduled his 50-percent jointte ancy interest as worth $257,500. 
If he had liquidated the property on the day of bankruptcy, his share of the proceeds 
would have been $141,497.50, or $91,497.50 net of his $50,000 homestead exemption. 
Meyer’s interest was subject to two judgment liens. I  first position was a lien of 
$275,000 owed to American Capital Resources, Inc. All Points Capital Corporation also 
had a judgment lien of $900,000. 
Meyer filed a motion under 11 USC §522(f)(1) to avoid both judicial liens. Section 
522(f)(2) provides a statutory formula for determining exceptions to exemptions that does 
not take fractional interests in property into account. American Capital Resources did not 
appear at the hearing. 
All Points Capital argued that the American Capital l en should be avoided by default, 
and then the consensual lien should be subtracted from the property’s value before 
computing the value of the debtor’s interest in the co-owned property. Under that theory, 
the equity of $282,995 for all owners would leave Myer with $141,497.50 in value, 
which after deducting the $50,000 homestead exemption would yield $91,497.50 that 
could survive the §522(f)(1) lien avoidance. 
The bankruptcy court did not enter a default against All Points Capital, but did grant 
the avoidance motion in its entirety without making any findings. 
The bankruptcy appellate panel vacated the order and remanded. Because an entry of 
default was not entered against American Capital, the bankruptcy court could not proceed 
to enter default judgment by granting the avoidance motion. Further, §522(f)(2) would 
provide nonexempt equity of $91,497.50 to which judgment liens could remain attached. 
Judicial liens that are being avoided under §522(f) as impairing exemptions are 
deducted in reverse order of priority. Bank of America v Hanger (In re Hanger) (9th Cir 
1999) 196 F3d 1292. Liens already avoided are excluded from the exemption-impairment 
calculation with respect to other liens. 11 USC §522(f)(2)(B). 
The bankruptcy court did not enter default against American Capital, and therefore 
could not enter default judgment. Default judgment is a matter of discretion in which the 
court may consider, among other things, the merits of the substantive claim. If the 
plaintiff is not entitled to the relief requested, then the court should not enter default and 
may even enter judgment in favor of the defaulted dfendant. Cashco Fin. Servs., Inc. v 
McGee (In re McGee) (BAP 9th Cir 2006) 359 BR 764. Meyer was not entitled to 
judgment on the merits. 
An avoidance motion prevents the fixing of a judgment lien on an interest of the debtor 
in property to the extent that such lien impairs an exemption to which the debtor is 
entitled. 11 USC §522(f)(1)(A). The exemption is impaired if, subtracting all of the 
unavoidable liens and the exemption from the value of the debtor’s half interest, the yield 
is zero or less. 11 USC §522(f)(2). 
In the case of fractionally owned property, if all the consensual liens are subtracted 
from the fractional interest, as literally required by §522(f)(2), the result could be that 
judicial liens are avoided that do not impair an exemption. Congress intended to overrule 
judicial decisions that had the consequence of frustrating a debtor’s ability to receive the 
full exemption authorized by law. A common-sense application, which conforms with 
congressional intent, nets out consensual liens against the entire fee in co-owned property 
before determining the value of a debtor’s fractional i terest and excludes those liens 
from the calculation of “all other liens on the proerty” under §522(f)(2)(A)(ii). 
By applying a mechanical approach, the bankruptcy court had effectively provided an 
exemption to Meyer of $141,497.50 when only $50,000 was merited. The goal is to 
achieve a balance between the creditor and debtor by assuring that the debtor receives the 
full exemption permitted by law and that the creditors secured by judicial liens do not 
lose their secured positions in value that is not exempt. 
THE EDITOR’S TAKE:  All Points Capital Inc. v Meyer attempts to resolve the issue of how 
to apply 11 USC §522(f)’s formula for avoiding judgment liens on property in which the 
debtor holds only a partial interest. The Bankruptcy Appellate Panel held that in determining 
the extent of avoidance, liens encumbering the entire property must be deducted from the 
whole property’s value, not just from the value of the debtor’s partial interest in the property.  
Meyer makes it much easier for judgment liens on a debtor’s partial interest in property to 
survive the debtor’s bankruptcy. Attorneys practicing in the Ninth Circuit, however, should 
caution clients who hold judgment liens that they should not rely too heavily on Meyer. The 
case is likely to be reversed on its pending appeal to the Ninth Circuit because the BAP 
ignored §522(f)’s plain meaning. 
A statute’s plain meaning must not be ignored except in the rare instance when its plain 
meaning causes an absurd result demonstrably at odds with congressional intent. The 
Meyer panel engaged in pure judicial activism by admittedly ignoring §522(f)’s plain 
meaning and “generously” interpreting §522(f) to reach a result the court believed made 
“common sense” without any evidence that §522(f)’s plain meaning was contrary to 
congressional intent or caused an absurd result.  
Determining the extent to which a judgment lien will be avoided under §522(f) by using a 
formula that deducts liens encumbering an entire property from the value of the debtor’s 
partial interest in that property is not inherently absurd. That very formula is used in similar 
contexts, such as when determining whether a judgment lien holder may foreclose on a 
California debtor’s partial interest in a homestead; it is the basis for an exemption under 11 
USC §522(b)(3)(B). Further, §522(f)’s legislative history does not discuss in any way how 
the section impacts a debtor’s partial interest in property. Thus, it is difficult to understand 
how the Meyer panel could have found that applying §522(f)’s plain meaning to a debtor’s 
partial interest in property was demonstrably contrary to congressional intent.  
In short, although at first blush Meyer seems to be a victory for judgment lien holders, the 
ultimate win likely will go to the debtors.—Roger Bernhardt 
 
